ABSTRACT With the popularity of Android smartphones, malicious applications targeted Android platform have explosively increased. Proposing effective Android malware detection method for preventing the spread of malware has become an emerging issue. Various features extracted through static and dynamic analysis in conjunction with machine learning algorithm have been the mainstream in largescale malware identification. In general, static analysis becomes invalid in detecting applications which adopt sophisticated obfuscation techniques like encryption or dynamic code loading. However, dynamic analysis is suitable to deal with these evasion techniques. In this paper, we propose an effective dynamic analysis framework, called EnDroid, in the aim of implementing highly precise malware detection based on multiple types of dynamic behavior features. These features cover system-level behavior trace and common application-level malicious behaviors like personal information stealing, premium service subscription, and malicious service communication. In addition, EnDroid adopts feature selection algorithm to remove noisy or irrelevant features and extracts critical behavior features. Extracting behavior features through runtime monitor, EnDroid is able to distinguish malicious from benign applications with ensemble learning algorithm. Through experiments, we prove the effectiveness of EnDroid on two datasets. Furthermore, we find Stacking achieves the best classification performance and is promising in Android malware detection.
effectiveness of the permission mechanism. As a consequence, the permission control mechanism can hardly limit the propagation of malicious applications.
Machine learning techniques, which can automatically infer behavior properties of applications when combined with program analysis techniques, have become mainstream in identification of malicious applications. These program analysis techniques can be roughly categorized into static approaches and dynamic approaches. Drebin [3] , ICCDetector [4] , and MamaDroid [5] perform static analysis to extract behavior features such as, requested permissions, API calls, intent types and network addresses from applications and apply standard machine learning algorithm to perform malware classification. Static analysis is advantageous to scan and check malicious applications quickly. In order to escape static analysis, many malicious applications adopt a series of deformation technologies, such as bytecode encryption, reflection and native code execution. These transformation techniques greatly challenge static analysis methods. In contrast, dynamic analysis performing by monitoring runtime behaviors of applications on real or virtual environments has been becoming promising because of its capability of resisting code transformation techniques. Crowdroid [6] , DroidDolphin [7] , and Droidward [8] perform dynamic analysis to monitor runtime behaviors such as API calls, system calls, and hidden icon operation, and combine supervised learning algorithms to implement effective malware detection.
In this work, we focus on runtime monitoring and profiling on applications for multiple types of behavior features, and implement highly effective malware detection. We perform a broad dynamic analysis and extract various features covering a wide variety of malicious behaviors such as personal information stealing, premium service subscription, malicious service communication, and complex anti-analysis techniques like malicious code encryption and dynamic code loading [9] . As stated in MADAM [10] , system calls describe the behaviors of device at the lowest level. Furthermore, any action performed by applications is eventually translated into a sequence of system calls. Therefore, we integrate system call trace of application to handle malicious behaviors causing damage to system or applications such as process tracing, blocking signal to the process, or interfering the execution of other process.
Considering the existence of noisy, irrelevant and redundant features, chi-square feature selection algorithm is applied to extract critical behavior features. By employing ensemble learning, we implement a novel dynamic analysis system called EnDroid, which is able to identify and classify malicious applications from benign. Ensemble learning combining results from multiple base machine learning algorithms can effectively improve classification performance of base learning algorithms. The generalization ability of an ensemble can be much better than a single learner. EnDroid adopts Stacking [11] to induce which base classifiers are reliable and which are not. Stacking usually achieves highest generalization accuracy by combining models built from different base classifiers with a meta-classifier. Through experiments, we find Stacking achieves the best performance and is promising in Android malware detection. In summary, we make the following contributions to Android malware detection: (1) We present EnDroid, an approach combining finegrained dynamic analysis with machine learning, being capable of implementing highly precise Android malware detection and family identification. The dynamic analysis covers system-level behavior trace and common application-level malicious behaviors like personal information stealing, premium service subscription, malicious service communication. (2) We perform various machine learning algorithms to verify the effectiveness of EnDroid and find Stacking based on existing ensemble methods achieves the best performance. (3) We verify the effectiveness of EnDroid on Android malware detection and family classification through a series of experiments. We also compare EnDroid's detection performance with state-of-art dynamic analysis tool Maline [12] and prove EnDroid's superiority in malware identification. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes recent work on Android malware detection. Section III details the system design of EnDroid. Section IV reports the experimental settings used in EnDroid and evaluates the detection performance of EnDroid. Section V discusses misclassified results and the limitations of EnDroid. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
With the rapid development and evolution of Android malware, Android application is facing a variety of threats. To defense Android applications against the infection of malware, applications have been analyzed and detected by various methods prior to installation. The methods for ensuring and vetting Android applications are basically divided into two categories: static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis generally involves an automated tool that takes source code or the executable file of an Android application, examines its program without executing it, and outputs analysis results by checking the code structure, the sequences of API call, and how sensitive information is processed through different function calls. DroidAPIMiner [13] extracts the frequency of API calls from applications and uses supervised learning algorithm to perform malware detection. DroidSIFT [14] focuses on permission-related API call and describes the behavior of applications by weighted API dependency graphs. It takes these graphs as features and combines machine learning algorithm to implement highly precise malware detection. DroidMiner [15] characterizes the behavior of applications by sequences of threat modalities, takes these modalities as feature and implements effective malware detection and family classification through machine learning. AppContext [16] describes the behavior of applications by the invocation of security-sensitive methods, including permission-protected methods, source and sink methods and reflection methods and dynamic code loading methods. It abstracts contexts to reflect the intentions of security-sensitive behaviors, and takes these extracted contexts as features to implement precise malware identification.
Although static analysis can effectively identify existing malicious applications, it may become invalid when malware uses reflection, native code, self-decrypting code, or other features that challenge static analysis. Dynamic analysis is capable of handling applications even with obfuscated or encrypted codes. TaintDroid [17] , a dynamic taint analysis system, detects the leakage of sensitive data among Android applications. After modification of the Android virtual machine interpreter, TaintDroid is able to perform system-wide taint tracking and reports information leaks in applications without any false positives. The analysis results indicate that most applications leak sensitive data, such as location, device ID and phone number. Chen et al. [18] monitor runtime API call and combines semi-supervised learning to implement highly precise malware detection. Andrubis [19] and Mobile-sandbox [20] combine static and dynamic analysis to obtain comprehensive behavior and achieve effective malware detection. MARVIN [21] is able to evaluate the risk of unknown Android applications through a combination of static and dynamic analysis. Mobile-Sandbox uses the results of static analysis to guide dynamic analysis and improves coverage of executed code. In addition, MobileSandbox is able to track API calls in native code. The disadvantage of Mobile-Sandbox and MARVIN is that they fail to achieve highly precise malware detection with dynamic analysis. In order to thoroughly analyze Android applications through dynamic analysis, in this work, we propose a dynamic analysis system called EnDroid. With the help of multiple types of behavior features and system-level behavior trace, EnDroid is able to implement effective malware detection.
Various feature selection algorithms have been used in malware detection approaches to select most critical features [4] , [5] , [22] . These approaches often apply mutual information, T-test, and PCA to remove noisy or redundant features and extract critical features. Wang et al. [22] explore most critical permissions and implements precise malware detection based on these sets. Roy et al. [23] state that original Drebin and DroidSIFT have numerous non-informative features and proves that more features may lead to worse classification performance. Therefore, EnDroid applies feature selection algorithm chi-square to identify risky dynamic behavior features.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF EnDroid
EnDroid consists of two phases, Training Phase and Detection Phase as shown in Fig. 1 . In the training phase, EnDroid extracts dynamic behavior features by monitoring operations of benign and malicious applications, and generates feature vector for every processed application. EnDroid takes the generated feature vectors of benign and malicious applications as input and trains a variety of base classifiers. Based on the prediction probabilities of these base classifiers for each application, EnDroid trains a final classification model by adopting a meta-classifier. This classification model can be used to distinguish between benign and malicious applications, and will be delivered to the detection phase. In the detection phase, EnDroid generates feature vector for each unknown application, and the classification model can judge whether the unknown application is benign or malicious based on its feature vector.
A. TRAINING PHASE

Dynamic Behavior Extraction:
In the first step of training phase, EnDroid captures runtime behavior information from a given application. To achieve this, we take the open source dynamic analysis tool DroidBox. This tool provides an application sandbox that extends TaintDroid, which adopts a dynamic taint analysis with system hooking at the framework layer and logs a variety of application actions such as, file and network access operations, information leaks, cryptography operations and so on. The process of this step is shown in Fig. 2 . The control script leverages MonkeyRunner to run application executable files inside DroidBox's monitoring environment for a period of time. We expand DroidBox's monitoring environment by using strace tool to log system calls that are related to process and I/O activities. In this work, we monitor 9 kinds of application actions as well as system calls invoked by the application. Beyond directly taking these 9 actions as features, we define formatively behavior features. The final feature format of EnDroid is shown in Table 1 .
1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
Android malware usually adopts cryptographic operations to encrypt root exploits, malicious payload, critical methods identifiers, targeted premium SMS numbers, and URLs to remote malicious servers to evade static detection. Some malicious applications move most of the function in a separate dex file and store this file in encryption form. In these malware, a decryption routine is created to decrypt the dex file, furthermore, this file will be loaded via dynamic class loader. Benign applications usually apply cryptographic APIs to secure data such as passwords and personal information. To distinguish different cryptographic behaviors, these features can be defined as <action>_<algorithm>. <action> means encryption, decryption and key generation operation. <algorithm> means different cryptographic algorithm.
2) NETWORK OPERATION
Android malware may uses web traffic to receive bot commands from malicious command and control (C&C) servers and fetches malicious payloads from malicious websites. Attackers make use of these malwares to remotely control an infected device, collect private personal information, or perform denial of service. DroidBox is able to monitor four kinds of network behaviors, including open and close network connection, send and receive network data. These features can be formed as <action>_<ip>_<port>. <action> means the four kinds of network behaviors.
3) FILE OPERATION
Android malicious applications usually scan the filesystem, search for various information such as bank accounts, installation and debugging information of target applications, and so on. These applications also create external files to store sensitive information or malicious payload downloaded from a remote server.These features can be formed as <action>_<filename>. <action> means reading or writing different files.
4) DEXCLASS LOAD
Android applications are now sided by new threats such as polymorphic and composition malware, which exploit dynamic code load to reduce the probability of being detected. Android malware usually loads additional .jar, .apk and .dex files from a library included in the application's assets, from another application (collusion attack) or from a remote system at runtime and executes malicious code not installed as part of this application. These features can be formed as load_<filename>.
5) INFORMATION LEAKS
Private and confidential data has recently received much public attention. Android malware usually actively harvests various information on infected devices, including IMEI, device specific identifiers, SMS contents, contact information, social network account credentials as well as banking information, and then stealthily sends these privacy information to remote server. The collected information can be used to track users, make profits, obtain legal account, etc. Privacy leakage occupies a large portion of threats by malware. These features can be formed as <source>_<sink>. <source> means operations obtaining sensitive information. <sink> means operations leaking sensitive information.
6) SENT SMS
Malware usually causes financial charges to infected users. Premium-rate services include subscriptions to information, services of gaming, charity donations, and so on. These services are value-added services provided by a telecom provider and charge users beyond the standard communi- cation charges. Android malware stealthily subscribes to premium-rate services by sending several SMS messages without user's consent. These features can be formed as sms_<number>.
7) PHONE CALLS
Android malware usually makes phone calls without the interaction from the user. These features can be formed as call_<number>.
8) SERVICE START
Android malware usually performs malicious behavior in a background processing contained in service components. These features can be formed as start_<servicename>.
9) RECEIVER ACTION
Android malware usually leverages system events to trigger its malicious behaviors. Registered broadcast receivers can be a good reflection of the monitored system events. As a typical example, registering reception of BOOT_COMPLETED intent in malware indicates triggering malicious activity directly after the startup of mobile device. These features can be formed as broadcast_<intentname>.
10) SYSTEM CALL
System calls stand for the knowledge on how applications request services from operating system's kernel. They provide useful functions to application. The functionality includes power management, device security, access to hardware resources, and process related to operations. Android malware usually invokes ptrace, sigprocmask, and getuid to affect the execution of other application and the successful execution of its process.
Feature Vector Generation: After the process of Dynamic Behavior Extraction, EnDroid obtains a set of dynamic behavior log-files. In practical, EnDroid treats each of the extracted behaviors in log-files as a detected feature. Therefore, the count of detected features equals to the size of Attribute Database. If the size of Attribute Database is S, EnDroid defines S-dimensional vector space. For each app, EnDroid constructs a feature vector by mapping its dynamic behavior log-file to the S-dimensional vector space as shown in Fig. 3 . The feature vector of an application can then be constructed by setting respective dimension for each extracted feature to 1 and all remaining dimensions to 0.
EnDroid extracts dynamic behavior features as many as possible from given applications and constructs feature vectors by mapping behavior log-files to vector space. Note that the dimensionality of feature vectors depends on the count of extracted dynamic behavior features. If EnDroid extracts too many dynamic behavior features in Dynamic Behavior Extraction, it leads to high dimensional feature vectors in Feature Vector Generation. However, some of these features are correlated to each other, may contain a high degree of noisy, irrelevant or redundant information, thus degrading the performance and efficiency of machine learning algorithms. Aiming at selecting a subset of features that can efficiently describe the training data, feature selection is applied to reduce dimensionality, remove redundant features, and mitigate overfitting.
In this work, we apply well-known filter method chi-square in EnDroid. Chi-square removes irrelevant or redundant features according to the correlation between feature and class. After the process, we keep a subset of original features which are sufficient for the classification of Android applications. Consequently, this method effectively reduces the dimensionality of feature vectors.
Chi-square measures the independence of two variables. Let c denote a random variable indicating the class of an application, malicious or benign. Every application is assigned a feature vector F = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f i , . . .) with f i being the value of the i-th dynamic behavior feature b i . In this paper, chi-square tests whether a dynamic behavior feature b i is relevant to a class c. The chi-square value χ 2 of dynamic behavior feature b i and class c is shown as
, For each dynamic behavior features b i , its relevance to class c can be evaluated by chi-square. We are especially interested in the dynamic behavior features that are strongly correlated with c. Therefore, we sort dynamic behavior features in decreasing order according to |χ 2 (b i , c)|, and select the top behavior features for classification.
Learning: In the training phase, EnDroid leverages twoclass classification algorithm to learn dynamic behavior features from benign and malicious applications, respectively. Given the input of feature vectors generated from benign and malicious applications, EnDroid applies supervised learning algorithms and outputs a classification model which is able to distinguish the feature vectors from benign applications and malware. The classification model is then transmitted to detection phase.
To exploit the advantage of different machine learning algorithms and to further improve the performance of malware detection, we employ ensemble of multiple base classifiers with a meta-classifier after obtaining the classification results of these learning algorithms. Five classifiers Decision Tree, Linear SVM, Extremely Randomized Trees, Random Forest and Boosted Trees are applied as base classifiers and Logistic regression is taken as meta-classifier.
Stacking: In Stacking, multiple base classifiers are trained with the training dataset and the output prediction probabilities from these classifiers are sent to a meta-classifier which is trained to make a final prediction. The performance of Stacking is not necessarily better than the individual classifiers. It depends on the selection of classifiers and functions used to combine the output prediction probabilities. represents the prediction probabilities of algorithm H i for datasets M train . rbind means combining several lists by row as a new matrix. Firstly, this algorithm splits the training dataset into k subsets, which is the preparation step in k-fold cross validation. Secondly, it trains base classifiers on aforementioned subsets. And then, new training and test datasets are constructed based on predication probabilities of based classifiers for each application. Finally, a final classifier is built on this new training dataset. In the following, the estimated output class probability P c (x) for an # constructing base classifiers 5: # splitting dataset into k subsets 6 :
for each algorithm H i in H do 8: for each subset M j train in M train do
end for 14 :
end for 17: # constructing new dataset for second stage 18: Trainset new ← ∪(P
Testset new ← ∪(P
L test ← Y LR .predict(Testset new ) 22 : end procedure application x of each based algorithms is shown in formula (where, in all cases, c P c (x) = 1).
Decision Tree: Suppose the application x falls one leaf of decision tree and the majority class at this leaf is C. Let t c be the count of (training) applications with class c at this leaf. Then, the estimated probability using a Laplace estimator is,
Linear SVM: Suppose application x locates at the class C side of hyperplane and the distance from application x to hyperplane is O(x). Then, the probability is,
,
Extremely Randomized Trees, Random Forest and Boosted Trees: Let Q be the count of decision trees in these ensemble methods. Suppose P q dt c (x) be the prediction VOLUME 6, 2018 probability of the qth decision tree for application x with class c. Then, the probability is,
In all five learning algorithms, the predicted class of base classifiers, given an instance x, is that C for which P C (x) > P c (x), for c = C.
Finally, Logistic regression is taken as the meta-classifier to combine the prediction probabilities of base classifiers for its simple interpretation. This classifier weights the base classifiers according to their prediction performance. These weights indicate the relative importance of base classifiers to each prediction class. Meta-classifier is able to induce which classifiers are reliable and improves the overall performance. Suppose ω and µ are two optimal trained parameters for the finally decision and P i c (x) be the prediction probability of ith base classifier for application x with class c. Formally, the prediction probability for each class is represented as:
Then, the finally decision label is:
B. DETECTION PHASE
In the detection phase, EnDroid extracts the dynamic behavior features from an unknown application and generates its feature vector. Based on this feature vector, the classification model is able to judge whether the application is benign or malicious.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
This section reports the experimental settings used in EnDroid, collected datasets and measure metrics for classification performance. Furthermore, we evaluate the detection performance of EnDroid through a series of experiments.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
EnDroid leverages dynamic analysis tool DroidBox to extract runtime behaviors of Android applications. Note that, for each analysis, DroidBox needs to set the duration time when one application runs in emulator environment. Aiming at providing highly precise analysis results, DroidBox tries to set duration time as large as possible to obtain all behaviors of applications. To keep a trade-off between precise and speed, we set the duration time to 60 seconds. Executing application within 60 seconds may be unable to capture enough behaviors of application. Some malicious behaviors may not be triggered in only 60 seconds or for the lack of specific input events. Obviously, when monitoring applications at more duration time, EnDroid captures more malicious behaviors and obtains more precise malware detection. However, based on fine-grained dynamic analysis (applicationlevel and system-level behaviors monitor), EnDroid is able to capture distinguishable features between benign and malicious applications in such limited duration time. With the help of parallel programming, we run DroidBox in a multithreading mode which is able to implement dynamic behavior extraction of each application in less than 15s on average.
EnDroid is deployed on a workstation Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2630 CPU (2.4GHz) and 128GB of RAM. We also perform a set of experiments to validate the effectiveness of EnDroid in this machine.
B. DATASET
In order to conduct extensive analysis on dynamic behavior features, we need to establish a large representative application set. For benign applications, we downloaded the most popular applications from Google Play Store at April, 2016. For each of the application categories in the store, we downloaded the top 80 most popular free applications. This gives us a total of 1962 benign applications. To exclude potential malware from these applications, we sent each application to VirusTotal [24] , which provides an antivirus service with many antivirus scanners. We labeled an application as benign if and only if all antivirus scanners detect no suspicious behavior. We also downloaded around 10000 Google Play applications from AndroZoo [25] dataset during May to September in 2016. As for malicious applications, we consider the Drebin dataset [3] . This malware dataset, consisting of 5560 malicious applications, is the largest public malware dataset available before 2014. As some applications fail to be analyzed by DroidBox, we finally obtain one dataset M1 consisting of 8806 benign applications and 5213 malicious applications. We further collected 5000 benign applications during January to March in 2017 and 5000 malicious applications from AndroZoo as another dataset M2. Android malware in this dataset involving samples collected after 2015 could be used to valid the detection performance ''in the wild''. In this dataset, all applications failed to be analyzed have been removed.
C. EVALUATION METRICS
To evaluate the performance of malware detection approach, we use six standard metrics: precision, true positive rate, false positive rate, ACC, F-measure and AUC. These metrics are defined based on true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), and false negative (FN). In a malware detection problem, TP denotes the count of malicious applications that are classified as malicious, TN denotes the count of benign applications that are classified as benign, FP denotes the count of benign applications that are misclassified as malicious, and FN denotes the count of malicious applications that are misclassified as benign. Precision is defined as TP divided by the total count of applications identified as malicious.
Precision = TP (TP + FP)
.
True positive rate (TPR) is defined as TP divided by the total count of malicious applications. (TP + FN ) .
TPR = TP
False positive rate (FPR) is defined as FP divided by the total count of benign applications,
Accuracy (ACC) is defined as the sum of TN and TP divided by the total count of all applications,
F-measure denotes the harmonic mean of precision and recall,
where in this definition, recall is referred to as true positive rate.
Higher values of precision, true positive rate and accuracy and lower value of false positive rate indicate higher detection quality. F-measure can be used as summary measure to combine precision and recall. An F-measure closes to 1 indicates good malware classification performance. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is another parameter for evaluating the performance of malware detection. This value can be interpreted as the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen malicious instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one. An area of 1.0 represents a perfect classifier, and an area of 0.5 indicates a worthless classifier.
D. FEATURE SELECTION AND ANALYSIS
In the following, we report the risky dynamic behaviors extracted by feature selection algorithms and analyze the effectiveness of these features for malware detection.
From dataset M1, EnDroid extracts 58709 dynamic behavior features in total. Since the extracted features contain redundant or irrelevant information due to correlation between features and noisy features, we apply feature selection method chi-square to remove useless features according to correlation evaluation criterion. After the process, chisquare chooses 5000 dynamic behavior features which are subsequently used for malware classification. Table 2 lists the main behavior feature categories, the count of features extracted, the count of features chosen by feature selection algorithm and the proportion of selected features. In Table 2 , the Phone Calls behavior is rare among applications, which makes chi-square filter this operation.
A majority of the dynamic behavior features removed by feature selection algorithm belong to File Operation and Dexclass load. When operating external files, application Since it is common to include package names in external filenames during mobile application development, EnDroid extracts numerous unique dynamic behavior features from file-related operations. We notice that most dynamic behavior features in this category only appear once in single application and are irrelevant with classification labels. Consequently, feature selection algorithm can effectively reduce the dimensionality of feature vectors after removing redundant features.
While feature selection algorithm filters out a majority of dynamic behavior features belonging to File Operation and Dexclass load, the reserved features in these categories are useful for distinguishing malicious from benign applications. For example, feature selection algorithm keeps dynamic behavior features like load_com.software.application-1.apk and write_PREFS.xml. These features mean loading external malicious payload and writing sensitive information to external files. These two specific dynamic behaviors can be found commonly in malware family FakeInstaller. Other feature like load_com.tutusw.phonespeedup-1.apk is shared by several DroidKungFu [26] malware samples. These malwares are included in repackaged applications which pretend to be legitimate packages, but stealthily collect a variety of information on the infected mobile device, including the IMEI, phone number, as well as Android OS version, and send these information to a remote server. The dynamic loading file com.tutusw.phonespeedup-1.apk has a confusing name so as to fool end users and evade from detections, which is normal in malicious applications but rare in benign. It is thus helpful to keep these dynamic behavior features for differentiating between malicious and benign applications.
We also analyze the selected dynamic behavior features belonging to Cryptographic Operation, Information Leaks, Service Start, Receiver Action, Sent SMS, and System Call. In general, these selected features can be sufficient in describing the runtime behaviors of application. In our experiments, Sent SMS behaviors like sms_6152, sms_97605, are mainly performed by malicious applications. The occurrence percentage of cryptographic operations selected by feature selection algorithm between malicious and benign applications are shown in Fig. 4 . In this figure, x-coordinate represents critical cryptographic operation selected by feature selection algorithm and y-coordinate represents the proportion of applications performing certain cryptographic operation to all applications adopting cryptographic operations. From Fig. 4 , we observe that malware writers tend to use simpler algorithms like DES, rather than more secure encryption algorithm like AES. The reason of this phenomenon is that malware usually applies encryption algorithms to evading detection. However, benign applications are used to take encryptions to ensure the confidentiality of transmission data. The occurrence percentage of information leak operation and system call selected by feature selection algorithm between malicious and benign applications are shown in Fig. 5 and 6. From Fig. 5 , we find that the behaviors of information leak are prevalent among benign and malicious applications. But information leak behaviors like IMSI_SMS, PHONE_NUMBER_Network, IMSI_File, and PHONE_NUMBER_File tend to appear more frequently in malicious applications. Other information leak behaviors like LOCATION_Network and LOCATION_GPS_Network tend to appear more frequently in benign applications. Fig. 6 shows the frequency difference of system call between benign and malicious applications. Malware tends to use system call more frequently than benign applications. System calls like fork, fchmod, and wait4 tend to appear more frequently in malicious applications. These system calls indicate malicious behavior of changing the owner of the files containing sensitive data or creating child processes to perform hidden malicious behaviors.
The top 20 informative features selected by feature selection algorithm and their chi-square values are presented in Table 3 . Chi-square measures the independence between two variables. In general, a greater chi-square value means that the feature is relevant for identifying malicious applications. Table 3 indicates distinguishable dynamic behaviors, such as cryptograph operation (hiding malicious behavior through encryption algorithm like DES or AES), sensitive information leakage (leaking IMEI, ICCID, IMSI through network or storing in files), system event monitor (monitoring events like BOOT_COMPLETED, SMS_RECEIVED, and PROVIDERS_CHANGED) and obtaining device status (reading files like cpuinfo, meminfo). These features are extracted from dynamic behaviors of dataset M1 and are indeed dataset specific. Top features and their chi-square may vary a lot in other datasets. However, these features, conforming to common malicious behaviors like information leaking, premium service subscription, system event monitoring and antianalysis techniques like payload encryption as stated in [9] , indicating suspicious runtime behaviors, are significant in malware classification.
E. PERFORMANCE OF MALWARE DETECTION
In the following, we evaluate the malware detection performance of EnDroid with different feature space, various machine learning algorithms, and different feature selection algorithms on datasets M1 and M2. Meanwhile, we compare EnDroid with existing approach Maline on dataset M2.
We conduct three experiments using ten-fold crossvalidation to measure the performance of EnDroid. On two datasets, we randomly split the benign dataset and the malicious dataset into ten subsets, respectively. Various machine learning algorithms are trained and tested in ten rounds. In each round, we combine one benign subset and one malicious subset as the test set, and combine the remaining subsets as the training set. In each round, there is no overlap between the test set and the training set. We also take majority voting as base ensemble learning algorithm for comparison with Stacking. In majority voting, the final result is decided based on the results obtained from the majority votes of base classifiers. Thus, if most of these base classifiers agree that the application is malicious, the final decision will be that it is a malware. Usually, ensemble of multiple classifiers with majority voting outperforms the performance of single base classifier.
In this work, we combine dynamic behaviors logged from Droidbox with system call trace to broadly describe behaviors of applications. To illustrate the effective of different features, we evaluate the performance of EnDroid with Dynamic Behaviors from DroidBox, System Calls, and Dynamic Behaviors from DroidBox + System Calls. Measure metrics with different feature space on two datasets are shown in Table 4 . From Table 4 , classification performance with System Calls alone is poor. Only 83-dimension system call features make it difficult for EnDroid to distinguish large amount of malware from benign applications. The classification performance of Stacking is superior to majority voting on various feature spaces. Assigning weights to different base learning algorithms according to their relative importance, makes Stacking exhibit better performance. EnDroid achieves effectively malware detection with an accuracy of 94.69% and 93.97% based on Dynamic Behaviors from DroidBox and improves their accuracies to 96.49% and 97.19% with the combination of system call features. Dynamic behavior features from DroidBox monitoring in conjunction with system call trace can perform effective malware detection. Table 5 shows the evaluation results of EnDroid on various machine learning algorithms. All machine learning algorithms are implemented in python scripts through sklearn [27] library. Tuning optimal parameters for each machine learning algorithm requires a large amount of experiments and is out of the scope of this paper. In this experiment, we compare machine learning algorithms with default settings and aim at illustrating the performance of Stacking. We find most learning algorithms perform well apart from Naive Bayes and KNN. The poor performance of these two algorithms is caused by: 1) the dynamic behavior features contain many noisy, irrelevant and redundant features, and these two algorithms do not contain feature selection in their learning process; 2) the dynamic behavior features exist correlation between each other, which degrade the performance of Naive Bayes; 3) Euclidean distance used in KNN cannot capture the similarity between applications based on dynamic behavior features, which makes KNN obtain poor performance. Stacking achieves the best performance, which can be used to improve the performance of Android malware detection. Existing ensemble approaches like bagging (Extremely Randomized Trees, Random Forest) and boosting (Boosted Trees and Xgboost) perform poor performance than Stacking. The reason is caused by: 1) Bagging and boosting assign weights once the base classifiers are trained. This weighting mechanism cannot determine which base classifier has learned which partition of the feature space. Applying metaclassifier, Stacking is able to determine which classifiers are likely to be successful in which part of the feature space and combine them accordingly; 2) Boosting can be used to improve predictive accuracy of weak classifiers. Bagging can only improve the predictive accuracy of unstable classifiers. Unlike these approaches which only combine the classifiers of same type, Stacking can combine different types of classifiers through a meta-classifier to maximize the generalization accuracy.
Dynamic behavior features extracted from EnDroid contains noisy, irrelevant or redundant features, which decrease the performance of malware detection. We adopt two feature selection algorithms to evaluate the classification performance of EnDroid. Table 6 shows the classification performance on two datasets after the process of feature selection algorithms mutual information and chi-square. From Table 6 , we find both feature selection algorithms are able to increase the malware detection performance and chi-square is superior to mutual information in terms of malware detection performance. Eventually, EnDroid is able to implement highly precise Android malware detection with F-measure of 0.9735, AUC of 0.9682 on dataset M1 and F-measure of 0.9830, AUC of 0.9702 on dataset M2.
Maline builds an automatic dynamic detection technique based on system call tracking. It adopts two feature representation strategies: frequency of system call and dependency of system call. These two representations both achieve highly effective malware detection in conjunction with several machine learning algorithms. Although Tam et al. [28] state that it is still possible to reconstruct high-level semantic behaviors using data from system call analysis, system call tracing alone is unable to capture application-level behaviors.
With the help of open source implementation of Maline, we run it on dataset M2 and compare its detection performance with EnDroid. The detection performance comparison is shown in Table 7 . From Table 7 , we find Maline implements effective malware detection on system call alone. Comparing with EnDroid based on System Calls with binary representation in Table 4 , system call dependency graph representation proposed in Maline greatly improves the malware detection performance. Although dependency graph representation of system call is able to capture distinguishable system call patterns between benign and malicious applications, Maline cannot obtain application-level behaviors like cryptographic operation, sms reception, dynamic code loading, and information leakage which are ubiquitous among nowadays malware. Integrating system-level with application-level behaviors, EnDroid is able to comprehensively describe runtime behaviors of application, precisely capture two-level behavior difference between benign and malicious applications and outperform Maline in malware detection.
F. DETECTION OF MALWARE FAMILIES
In this experiment, we evaluate the malware family classification performance of EnDroid on Drebin dataset. All of these malicious applications belong to known malware families, such as DroidKungFu, Geinimi, and GoldDream [29] , etc. In the following, we evaluate the detection performance of EnDroid for each of the top 20 largest amount of malware families separately. In particular, most families show a detection rate of more than 90%, where two of them can be identified perfectly (Kmin, SendPay). However, looking at the results more closely, we see that EnDroid performs quite poorly on malware family Gappusin [30] . Specifically, among the 46 samples that we analyzed, EnDroid only identifies 22 of these applications as malware. Upon further inspection of this family, we find that many samples of Gappusin act as a downloader for further fetching malicious payload and thus do not exhibit common malicious behaviors, such as privacy leakage or financial charge. Although it is possible to extract features which match the behaviors of Gappusin family, the ip address of the external server, there are too few features to identify these samples as malicious. Other misclassified malware families are mainly caused by that malicious behaviors may not be triggered during dynamic analysis, resulting in judgement based on insufficient features.
To further inspect the malware family classification performance of EnDroid, we consider four well-known malware families, namely FakeInstaller, DroidKungFu, GoldDream [29] and GingerMaster [31] . For each sample of these families, we present top features selected by chi-square from Section IV-D and discuss how they characterize the attack exhibited by different malware families. Top five features with largest chi-square values for each malware family are shown in Table 9 .
FakeInstaller hides its malicious code inside repackaged of popular applications and sends expensive SMS messages to premium services. The extracted features indicate that the malware uses SMS functionality, cryptographic operation and leaks sensitive information. In detail, the malware registers SMS reception event and sends messages to number 3200 and 97605.
DroidKungFu tries to exploit several vulnerabilities to gain root access and steals sensitive data from the device. The extracted features indicate that the malware performs common malicious behaviors like information leaks and cryptographic operation. As an example, the malware collects various sensitive information and sends these information to remote server 115.182.xx.xx.
GoldDream is a Trojan which monitors an infected device, collects sensitive data and records information from received SMS messages. The extracted features indicate that the malware reads of SMS message, collects IMEI, IMSI and sends these information to external server 162.105.xx.xx.
GingerMaster is a Trojan which is often bundled with benign applications, steals sensitive data and sends privacy information to a remote server. The malware starts its VOLUME 6, 2018 malicious behaviors as soon as it receives a BOOT_ COMPLETED intents. These top features can be a significant part of malicious behaviors.
G. RUNTIME MEASUREMENT
We use ten-fold cross-validation to evaluate the effectiveness of EnDroid and measure the average runtime. On dataset M1, in each of ten rounds, EnDroid is trained with 12617 applications (i.e., 90% of datasets), and tested with a mixture of 880 benign apps and 521 malicious apps. In the training phase, dynamic analysis tool DroidBox executes each app file and logs various behavior operations in runtime. Dynamic Behavior Extraction then transforms these operation types and targets to behavior features. After processing all applications in training dataset and storing all dynamic behavior features in attribute database, EnDroid generates a feature vector for each processed app. EnDroid outputs a malware classification model based on all feature vectors in the training phase. In the detection phase, each app is processed by the same components Dynamic Behavior Extraction, Feature Vector Generation as in the training phase. Based on its feature vector, the classification model is able to label the application as ''benign'' or ''malicious''. Table 10 shows the average time for processing each application in our experiments. The performance bottleneck is at dynamic analysis. In the future, the performance of EnDroid would be improved with the development of more efficient dynamic analysis tool.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In the following, we firstly summarize the pros and cons of existing state-of-art Android malware detection approaches, then discuss the false positives and negatives caused by EnDroid, and finally state the limitation of this paper.
DroidDeepCNN [32] proposes a novel android malware detection system based on raw opcode sequence from disassembled applications. It implements highly precise malware classification by using deep convolutional neural network.
Adagio [33] states that detection approaches based on permission and API usage are susceptible to instruction level obfuscation techniques. It proposes a detection method based on function call graphs and maps these graphs into vector space capturing structural relationships by using graph kernels. Finally, it implements highly effective malware detection by using machine learning technique based on vectorial representation of function call graphs.
Allix et al. [34] proposes a scalable approach based on CFGs (Control Flow Graph). It builds feature sets based on textual representation of basic blocks extracted from CFG which retains information about the structure of the application code. Subsequently, it trains a Random Forest classifier with these features to detect malware.
Revealdroid [35] introduces a highly accuracy, scalability and obfuscation resiliency malware detection approach. To address obfuscation techniques that aim at thwarting detection, it presents lightweight analysis that is able to extract API-based features including resolution of reflection calls as well as function calls made by native binaries. Through experiments, Revealdroid proves its classification performance superiority to state-of-the research approaches.
MKLDroid [36] proposes a unified framework that systematically integrates multiple features such as API dependencies, permission dependencies, information source and sink dependencies, instruction sequences and CFG patterns to perform comprehensive malware detection. It uses graph kernel to capture structural and contextual information from PRGs (Program Representation Graph) of applications and provides malicious code location for malicious behavior interpretation in combined with Multiple Kernel Learning [37] . SMART [38] constructs hierarchical semantic models of Android malware based on DSA (Deterministic Symbolic Automaton) which can capture common malicious behaviors of malware family. In the first phase, it identifies suspicious applications by combining machine learning algorithm with risky API-usage extraction. In the second phase, it uses DSA inclusion to confirm the maliciousness of suspicious applications.
All the above methods apply static code analysis to extract feature for machine-learning based malware detection. Some methods are resilient towards simpler obfuscation techniques, such as instruction reordering, branch inversion, renaming of packages and identifiers, junk code injection, or even malicious code packed in native code. However, sophisticated obfuscation techniques like dynamic code loading, reflection and malicious payload encryption which require runtime information are hard to capture by pure static analysis. As stated in [9] , the evolution of Android malware shows the urgent need for advanced de-obfuscation and dynamic analysis methods. In this paper, we focus on dynamic analysis and integrate multiple types of dynamic features to perform effective malware detection. Our approach can be complementary for existing static analysis methods.
As Stacking shows the best performance for detection of Android malware, we carefully investigate in detail the false negatives and false positives it produces. On dataset M1, when Stacking successfully detects 96.56% malware (227 malware undetected), simultaneously it produces 1.85% false positives (163 benign applications falsely reported). Thorough investigation, we find that most false negatives are caused by too less dynamic behavior features extracted. The reason is that some malicious behaviors cannot be triggered in our dynamic analysis environment. Benign applications owning some critical behavior such as dynamic code loading, encryption or some risky behaviors, which causes false positives. For example, benign applications may use dynamic code loading to load updated components and encryption algorithm to encrypt user's sensitive information or send contact information to cloud server for backup.
Similar to other approaches leveraging dynamic analysis with machine learning to analyze and distinguish malicious applications from benign, EnDroid has same limitations. The main limitations are inherent from dynamic analysis approaches. The dynamic analysis platform MokeyRunner+DroidBox may fail to trigger malicious behaviors of malware in some situations due to problems when lacking necessary resources, lacking of necessary UI operations or lacking of necessary of libary. If, for example, malware tries to obtain malicious payloads, exploits codes from third-party server or connects a command and control server to obtain instructions, when these servers fail to connect, the malware may unable to continue performing malicious behaviors. In addition, malware may execute malicious behaviors only when certain system events, such as receiving an SMS message, or when certain operations when users perform, such as entering legal user identity and password. If the analysis platform fails to perform these events, malicious behaviors of these malwares cannot be triggered. Lastly, malware may detect the runtime environment and stop executing malicious actions, in this case the analysis platform will not log effective behavior information. This evasion technique can be carried out by identification of Android emulator or monitoring procession.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a novel dynamic analysis framework, called EnDroid, which automatically extracts multiple types of dynamic behavior features to implement effective malware detection. We apply feature selection algorithm chisquare to remove irrelevant or noisy features and extract critical features. These critical features help to identify risky behaviors in real-world applications. EnDroid then applies Stacking to implement effective malware detection. On two datasets, we verify the Android detection performance of EnDroid with different feature space, various machine learning algorithms and different feature selection algorithms. The experimental results show that Stacking achieves the best classification performance and is promising in Android malware detection.
Despite of the effectiveness of EnDroid, there are several issues remaining to be resolved. Our future work will focus on addressing the following problems. EnDroid only takes ip and port as features for network operations, which will miss network-based malware. We would investigate to combine automatically network traffic analysis tool to deeply analyze malicious network behaviors and implement more accurate malware detection. While our dynamic analysis is precise, it can only detect executed malicious behaviors during the analysis. We would investigate to combine input generator tools IntelliDroid [39] 
